



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER  
**CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL**  
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Issue No. 385, 5 November 2004

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Christian Science Monitor  
November 3, 2004

## **New Details About Saddam Hussein, Gleaned From The CIA**

***Iraq's dictator developed an aversion to using telephones and a penchant for writing novels as he sparred with the UN.***

By Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON – Saddam Hussein opened the meeting by complaining about collars. The neckline of a suit designed for use in an upcoming ceremony was too high, the Iraqi dictator told assembled senior officials. It should be lowered, just a little, so the underlying shirt would be visible without being too obvious.

Then he segued into more important matters.

"I want to make sure that - close the door please - the germ and chemical warheads ... are available [to those concerned], so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targets?" Mr. Hussein asked.

This conversation, recorded on a 15-minute audiotape obtained by the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, probably took place during the second week of January 1991. US officials say it is evidence of the keen interest Hussein took in weapons of mass destruction - although he never did order use of WMDs against US forces in the Gulf War.

But it is also evidence of something broader: the nature of Saddam Hussein himself. Today, as they sift through the detritus of a dictatorship deposed, intelligence analysts are piecing together a much fuller picture of the man who made Iraq his fiefdom, and of how he constructed and controlled his government.

This is both a historical and a judicial exercise. At his coming trial the new Iraqi government will likely portray him as not so much a cartoonish tyrant as a detail-oriented executive, a strongman personally responsible for the evils and excesses of his regime. And the world may see what Hussein's FBI interrogator already knows: In person he is tough, querulous, and compelling.

"This is a very cagey guy," said a US official with access to Hussein's debriefing transcripts at a recent meeting with reporters.

New details about Hussein's work habits, ego, underlings, and goals have become public in recent weeks with the release of the report by Charles Duelfer on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. While the work focuses on the fate of Hussein's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, buried in its 1,000+ pages are revelations about the man himself, many apparently derived from interviews with captured Iraqi officials.

Hussein, for instance, apparently developed an aversion to telephones following the Gulf War. By his own account, he used a phone only twice in the past 14 years, for fear of being pinpointed for US attack.

Even the highest regime officials said they gave up trying to phone Hussein long ago, and often had difficulty finding him, even in times of crisis. Fear of assassination made him inaccessible.

"Sometimes it would take three days to get in touch with Saddam," ex-Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jizrawi told the Iraq Survey Group.

Yet until the last years of his regime Hussein dominated Iraqi institutions, and ruled by personal fiat, according to the CIA. He would ponder key decisions, such as whether to invade Kuwait, for months - yet share his thoughts with few others.

He had a high opinion of himself, after all. He believed he was the inheritor of the tradition of such great Iraqi leaders as Hammurabi. Bricks used in the reconstruction of the ancient city of Babylon were molded with the phrase "Made in the era of Saddam Hussein."

He was opposed to personal corruption - perhaps because he used money as a reward to manipulate his regime's top ranks. He tried to use it to manipulate his way out of UN sanctions, too. Hussein personally approved the list of foreigners and foreign firms eligible for secret oil allocations as part of the UN oil-for-food program.

Hussein claimed to meet regularly with the Iraqi people, to learn their concerns; women are particularly good sources of information about operations within government ministries, he told interrogators.

Aides learned not to confront him with bad news, or controversial suggestions, even if he requested unvarnished advice. In 1982, Hussein asked his ministers for creative ideas about ending the Iran-Iraq War, and his health minister took the bold step of suggesting that Hussein temporarily resign, and then resume power following a peace treaty.

Hussein ordered the man executed, and his dismembered body delivered to his wife, former Deputy Prime Minister Abd-al-Tawab Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh told US interrogators.

A deprived and violent village childhood shaped Hussein, according to the Duelfer report. As Iraq's economy unravelled under UN sanctions in the mid-1990s, Hussein turned more and more to his relatives and fellow natives of Tikrit, undermining existing government hierarchies.

"The last three years with Saddam bothered me the most. There were too many relatives in sensitive jobs," former Vice President Ramadan told US interrogators.

From 1998 onward, senior officials noted a change in Hussein's demeanor. Formerly a workaholic, the dictator appeared less and less prepared for meetings. He appeared preoccupied with other concerns, such as the novels he was writing at the time.

Tariq Aziz, one of Hussein's highest-ranking aides for years, told the US that Hussein badly misjudged the effect of Sept. 11. He was too slow to realize that the Bush administration seriously intended to invade. Then, he was overconfident in the ability of his military to slow the US advance.

"He thought that you would only use your Air Force," Aziz told a US debriefer.

One of the biggest mysteries surrounding Hussein's behavior remains why he continued to posture as if he retained stocks of WMD, when in fact he apparently got rid of them under pressure from UN weapons inspectors.

Ironically, the pre-invasion intensity of the Bush administration's insistence that Iraq retained such weapons led at least one high Iraqi official to suspect that Bush was right.

Following Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 12, 2002, ex-Deputy Prime Minister Huwaysh began to wonder whether Hussein had in fact retained chemical or biological weapons.

"Huwaysh could not understand why the United States would challenge Iraq in such stark and threatening terms, unless it had irrefutable information," says the Duelfer report.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1103/p03s01-usgn.html>

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USA Today  
November 3, 2004  
Pg. 21

## **Chemical Weapons Disposal Behind Schedule**

*Fears mount in communities storing them*

By Peter Eisler, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is missing treaty deadlines for wiping out its chemical weapons, which raises concerns about possible terrorism or accidents at eight U.S. sites where the stockpiles are to be destroyed.

Federal audits find that the military will not eliminate its 31,000 tons of deadly nerve gases and skin-blistering agents by 2012 as required by the international Chemical Weapons Convention.

The military destroyed only 6% of the arsenal in the past 12 months. And disposal plants that were supposed to start this summer in Newport, Ind., and Pine Bluff, Ark., still aren't running. In all, 32% of U.S. chemical weapons have been eliminated since work began in 1990.

The Pentagon's struggles to meet destruction deadlines lessens U.S. leverage to press Russia to eliminate its chemical arms, seen by U.S. officials as a proliferation risk.

Local officials and community activists near the eight U.S. disposal sites where chemical weapons remain stockpiled say the delays also raise domestic safety and security risks. They fear accidental chemical releases or attacks by terrorists to detonate or steal the weapons. One artillery round filled with nerve gas could kill thousands in a crowd.

"The (disposal) timetable is out the window," says Craig Williams of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, a citizen coalition monitoring U.S. progress. "Our national security is hindered by letting our own weapons of mass destruction languish in U.S. communities."

Under the 1997 weapons convention, the United States and Russia were to destroy 45% of their chemical stockpiles by April 2004, with total elimination by 2007. Both nations got extensions on the 45% deadline, and both say they will exercise options to extend the final deadline by five years, to 2012.

Technical problems and construction snags have stalled chemical weapons disposal at several U.S. incineration plants this year. And the Pentagon in September froze design work on a disposal plant slated for Pueblo, Colo., that will neutralize chemical agents instead of burning them. That decision also slows the design of a similar plant in Blue Grass, Ky.

Because of the delays, the Pentagon has raised cost estimates for eliminating its chemical arsenal from \$15 billion to \$24 billion. Officials now believe costs will rise an additional \$1.4 billion, according to reports by Congress'

Government Accountability Office (GAO).

"Current (Pentagon) schedule estimates show that the Army will not complete destruction of the entire stockpile until after the year 2012," the GAO reported this year.

Michael Parker, who manages the military's disposal program, says the audits don't account for recent changes that make the program more efficient.

"I still think we have a reasonable shot ... at 2012," he says.

In the months after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, the Bush administration promised an urgent effort to secure and destroy both U.S. and Russian stockpiles of chemical weapons. Officials scrambled to boost protection of U.S. caches and speed disposal efforts. And they promised financial aid to help Russia do the same.

Since then, the Pentagon has moved all U.S. chemical weapons into hardened bunkers and destroyed one of its nine original stockpiles, on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Russia has added new fences, alarms and other security measures at major storage sites.

"The sooner we get rid of these weapons, the safer we're all going to be. But it's been a very costly, technically challenging and politically laden process," says Paul Walker of Global Green USA, a U.S.-Russian watchdog group pushing for safe and rapid destruction of both countries' chemical weapons. Because of the U.S. disposal delays, "the Russians really have felt a bit left off the hook," he says.

The U.S. and Russian arsenals include VX and sarin nerve gases as well as blister agents such as mustard gas. All are stored both in bulk containers and armed munitions. U.S. holdings total 31,000 tons. Russia has close to 40,000 tons.

The United States spends about \$1.5 billion a year to protect and dispose of chemical weapons. That's about twice as much as Russia, even counting hundreds of millions of dollars the Russians get each year in U.S. and European assistance. But the Pentagon's investment is bringing limited progress:

\*The Bush administration warned Congress this year that the U.S. disposal program has a high potential for failure. The assessment, provided in a 2004 budget addendum, gave the program a score of 17% out of 100% on progress toward destroying all stockpiles by 2012.

\*The Pentagon has repeatedly pushed back its schedules for destroying the weapons. Some Pentagon reviews, cited in congressional reports, suggest the program could miss the 2012 deadline by several years or more.

\*As of April, six of 10 states that are near the eight remaining U.S. stockpiles were considered fully prepared for emergencies, such as chemical leaks or a terror attack, according to the GAO audits. The other four states were close to being prepared. But delays in disposing of the weapons are increasing safety and security costs. Community requests for federal money to help with emergency preparedness exceeded budget allotments by \$88 million in the last two years.

Parker says all the stockpile sites "are in a very strong security posture now." But he says the coming months will be a "cardinal moment" in salvaging any prospect of making the 2012 disposal deadline.

One key goal, Parker says, is to begin operating the disposal plants in Indiana and Arkansas, where startups were delayed by technical problems.

At the same time, the Pentagon must keep work on schedule at incineration plants that are running in Anniston, Ala., Umatilla, Ore., and Deseret, Utah. Work at the Utah plant resumed earlier this year after a nine-month halt caused by a small chemical leak.

The Pentagon also must get the planned neutralization plants in Colorado and Kentucky back on track after freezing design work because plans wouldn't meet disposal schedules at an acceptable cost.

The final hurdle is funding to keep the program on track, especially given its troubled history.

"If any part of (the equation) fails to happen," Parker says, "it makes it extremely problematic against the treaty deadline of 2012."

[http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-11-02-chemweapons-usat\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-11-02-chemweapons-usat_x.htm)

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Birmingham (AL) News

November 2, 2004

## **Sarin Rocket Burn Done, VX Risk Believed Worse**

By Katherine Bouma, News staff writer

The risk from chemical weapon storage at the Anniston Army Depot has dropped 30 percent or more, according to the Army's studies, because the last sarin-loaded rocket was destroyed over the weekend.

The Army has spent more than a year slowly gearing up its chemical weapons incinerator, putting it through a series of tests and ultimately destroying 42,738 M55 rockets and 47,033 gallons of sarin they contained.

More than 660,000 Cold War-era weapons are stockpiled at Anniston, due to be destroyed under an international treaty.

The Army began destroying the sarin-loaded M55 rockets first because of a study that showed they presented 90 percent or more of the storage risk at the depot. Later studies have not held up that number, Army spokesman Mike Abrams said, but have indicated VX weapons could pose a greater risk.

While Army officials and their contractor, Westinghouse Anniston, celebrated the milestone, anti-burn activists warned that the worst is ahead.

"It's a good thing that they got rid of the GB M55s and they didn't kill anybody," said Craig Williams, executive director of Chemical Weapons Working Group. "They've accomplished that. The risk of the stockpile has diminished."

However, the VX weapons remain, Williams said, and present a greater risk than incinerating sarin. "VX is very stable unless it's subjected to heat," Williams said. "It's persistent. It stays on the ground. It stays on the vegetation. If it gets on you, it will kill you."

Sarin is more volatile than VX, meaning that it is easily turned into a gas, but it quickly dissipates in the atmosphere and does not cling to vegetation or people.

Neither sarin nor VX is expected to escape into the atmosphere under the Army's incineration plans. But some activists and residents believe the facility is not as safe as it should be nor its alarms as effective as they could be.

VX weapons also present a greater risk in storage, the Army now says. After both VX and GB rockets are gone, the risk of storage at the depot will have decreased by 98 percent, Abrams said.

Before moving on to VX weapons, however, the Army will finish its sarin work by destroying three types of artillery packed with the lethal liquid.

Westinghouse will not have to undergo any further testing or receive new permits, according to the state. It will have to retool the equipment, Abrams said.

"We don't have a specific date, but we expect that we can slowly begin 8-inch artillery processing in mid-December," Abrams said. "The entire artillery campaign should take us through the better part of 2005." The Army estimates it will take until 2010 to destroy the 4 million pounds of sarin, VX and blister agent that remain in the Anniston Army Depot stockpile.

<http://www.al.com/search/index.ssf?/base/news/1099390776228230.xml?birminghamnews?nstate>

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San Francisco Chronicle

November 2, 2004

Pg. 6

## **White House Takes Aim At U.N.'s Nuclear Chief**

By Robert Collier, Chronicle Staff Writer

While President Bush and Sen. John Kerry were arguing last week over the looting of high explosives in Iraq, a parallel fight was being waged in the shadows, one that could bedevil U.S. foreign policy long after today's election. The White House was locked in combat with an old adversary -- Mohamed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency -- whose cooperation the United States needs to prevent nations such as Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

Some administration supporters accuse ElBaradei of orchestrating the scandal over 377 tons of missing explosives at the Al Qaqaa military base to help Kerry defeat Bush, and they suggest the case will deepen distrust between Washington and the United Nations.

"ElBaradei would like nothing better than to see President Bush lose ...," said Clifford May, president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, a conservative-leaning Washington think tank.

After the explosives story broke last week, Bush administration officials said they would oppose ElBaradei's bid for a third term as head of the agency when it comes up for renewal next year. Although the United States does not have veto power on the IAEA's 35-member board, opposition from Washington would carry considerable weight, and some analysts say the administration is determined to oust him.

"The people I've talked to in the administration are absolutely convinced that ElBaradei is trying to defeat Bush, and what happened (last) week means they will do anything it takes to make sure that he doesn't get another term," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

ElBaradei, in an Oct. 1 letter to the U.N. Security Council, said that widespread looting of weapons in Iraq had occurred. Responding to ElBaradei's request for more information on the subject, Mohammed Abbas, an official of the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology, reported that explosives at Al Qaqaa were lost after the U.S. takeover because of "theft and looting of the governmental installations due to lack of security."

The issue caught fire on the campaign trail after the letter was leaked to the New York Times. Kerry accused Bush of "incompetence" for not keeping the caches of explosives under control, and administration defenders suggested that ElBaradei might have coaxed Abbas to complain to the IAEA.

"Did ElBaradei in some way persuade the Iraqi official that this letter was needed at this time because of the election?" asked May. "This fuels the suspicion that ElBaradei is attempting to manipulate an American election by spreading false information."

ElBaradei called the accusations "total junk."

"The timing probably is unfortunate, but there is a world out there other than the American election," he said Friday.

"It's unfortunate that it's taking a political spin," he said in a separate interview. "That's not ours."

The Bush administration's differences with ElBaradei began before the Iraq war, when U.N. arms inspectors led by Hans Blix fanned out across Iraq searching for weapons of mass destruction. The administration constantly criticized their efforts as being too weak. Relations became further strained when ElBaradei reported to the Security Council that contrary to U.S. assertions, Iraq did not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program.

At the time, Vice President Dick Cheney called ElBaradei "wrong" and said he "consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing."

After the war, U.S. weapons inspection groups in Iraq determined that ElBaradei's findings had been correct.

The Egyptian soon took the offensive on other sensitive issues, criticizing the Bush administration's plans to develop so-called bunker-buster nuclear weapons.

"The U.S. government demands that other nations not possess nuclear weapons," ElBaradei said in August 2003.

"Meanwhile, it is arming itself. If we do not stop applying double standards, we will end up with more nuclear weapons."



The Bush administration, meanwhile, refused to allow U.N. inspectors to return to postwar Iraq to complete their weapons searches, despite pleas from both ElBaradei and Blix. Some analysts see the administration's animus toward ElBaradei as part of a broader distrust of the United Nations.

"There are personal issues with ElBaradei, but it is more fundamental, with the Bush administration opposed to any fundamental role for the United Nations," said Lee Feinstein, a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations who was an official in the Pentagon and State departments under the Clinton administration.

One former Pentagon official in the Bush administration said the distrust extended to much of the information that came from U.N. arms inspectors when formulating strategy before and during the war.

U.N. intelligence "was generally not used," said Marc Garlasco, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official who headed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's team directing high-value missile targeting. Instead, he said in an interview, U.S. war planners were focused on killing Saddam Hussein and his top aides. "Arms stashes were just not a priority," he said. "But when you're talking about potential WMD, it boggles the mind why Al Qaeda wasn't higher on the list," he said.

Administration officials, looking to curtail the influence of the IAEA, note that the agency's 1957 charter tasks it primarily with promoting the nuclear energy industry and ensuring that uranium and plutonium are not taken out of nuclear power plants. The charter does not specifically authorize the IAEA's current role of investigating and enforcing nuclear nonproliferation accords, they say, and the IAEA should defer all weapons-related controversies to the U.N. Security Council.

"This goes to a fairly fundamental question here: whether the IAEA's board recognizes that it is not the responsible agency for the conduct of the affairs involving international peace and security, but that the Security Council is," said John Bolton, the State Department's chief arms-control official, in a speech in September. The administration has been ratcheting up pressure on Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, and it is expected to make a big push later this month urging the IAEA to pass the issue to the Security Council for possible sanctions against Tehran's Islamic government.

"That's what we think, and that's why we've been pressing for it," Bolton said. "That's why we're going to continue to press for it in November."

<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/11/02/MNGVT9KBTQ1.DTL>

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Seattle Post-Intelligencer  
November 2, 2004

## **Anthrax Vaccine To Be Studied In Seattle**

By Tom Paulson, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Reporter

A team of Seattle scientists has received \$3.5 million from the federal government to use its innovative molecular detective technique to study and perhaps improve upon the military's troubled anthrax vaccine.

"There's a major effort under way to improve the vaccine," said Dr. Jerry Nepom, director of Seattle's Benaroya Research Institute at Virginia Mason and a world leader in the molecular biology of immune system response.

An artificial molecule created by Nepom and his team, which they call a "tetramer," may turn out to be a critical tool in this effort.

The private, non-profit Benaroya Research Institute was awarded one of 14 grants in a \$74 million program launched yesterday by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The project aims to find better vaccines or drugs to protect against infectious diseases such as influenza, West Nile virus or bioterrorism agents such as anthrax.

A major need for the military is to find a better vaccine against anthrax, a form of bacteria that can be used as an inhalation agent of warfare or terrorism.

Last week, a federal judge ordered the Pentagon to stop requiring that military personnel get the anthrax vaccine. Service personnel have sued the Defense Department over the mandatory vaccination, arguing that the vaccine was rushed through approval before the Iraq War and that there's evidence it is causing immune illnesses in a significant number of the soldiers vaccinated.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in a response sent last week to top military officials, said he and others remain convinced "that anthrax vaccine is safe and effective."

Most scientists, however, would agree that the current vaccine -- even if it turns out to be safe and effective enough to do the job -- is still crude, cumbersome and far from ideal.

A single company, Bioport of Lansing, Mich., produces the vaccine under government contract using the centuries-old technique of filtering killed bacteria. The vaccine must be administered by six injections over 18 months and repeated regularly to maintain immunity.

Nepom and Dr. William Kwok, Benaroya's principal investigator for this project, believe their engineered molecule could quickly point the way to a better vaccine.

Most experimental vaccines are assessed for effectiveness by measuring the body's production of antibodies -- immune system cells that are created in the blood in response to foreign invaders. The problem with this method, said Nepom, is it is an indirect measure of a delayed immune response that cannot evaluate the power (or weakness) of the vaccine.

"It's like following footprints in the sand rather than watching someone as they run by," he said.

With the tetramer -- so called because it has four "arms" that identify and latch onto their targets -- scientists can directly track the activity of a vaccine in the blood, Nepom said. Tetramers track a different kind of immune system cells, known as "T-cells."

"This is the first method to do this," Nepom said.

For a vaccine to work, it must produce a vigorous immune system response that kills the invaders. The more precise a vaccine is in what kind of immune system response it prompts, the less risk of side effects -- collateral damage to healthy cells or inappropriate immune system attacks. T-cells are the brains of the immune system. They direct the antibodies.

Nepom and his colleagues created tetramers to mimic the parts of T-cells that recognize specific invaders -- a flu virus, a West Nile virus or anthrax bacteria. If a vaccine is working, producing the specific kind of T-cell needed to repel an invasion, Nepom's team can create tetramers to identify and latch onto these T-cells.

Once the tetramer and the T-cell find each other and bond, the tetramer fluoresces -- literally lighting up to be detected by specialized lasers.

"Before this method, this was really a needle-in-the-haystack problem," Nepom said. One drop of blood has about a million T-cells in it, he said, which target as many as 250,000 different viral or bacterial invaders. It was impossible to track T-cells directly.

The tetramers now allow scientists to directly "see" what a vaccine is doing to prompt immunity, Nepom said, rather than the indirect method of looking for antibodies.

Nepom said the tetramer technology, which grew out of the organization's expertise studying diabetes and immunity, could be applied to finding better weapons against most infectious diseases.

Most pharmaceutical firms continue to use the antibody method when testing their experimental vaccines, Nepom said, largely because this has been the standard approach that regulators expect and they have invested in it.

[http://seattlepi.nwsourc.com/national/197772\\_anthraxvax02.html?searchpagefrom=1&searchdiff=2](http://seattlepi.nwsourc.com/national/197772_anthraxvax02.html?searchpagefrom=1&searchdiff=2)

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Moscow Times

Wednesday, November 3, 2004. Page 3.

## **Ex-Physicist Stored Plutonium in His Garage**

By [Simon Saradzhyan](#)

Staff Writer

A former nuclear physicist voluntarily surrendered several containers containing plutonium in the eastern Siberian town of Zmeinogorsk, but local police are considering charging him with illegal possession of radioactive materials, news agencies reported Tuesday.

Leonid Grigorov, 56, a former employee of a local mining company, turned over 10 containers containing plutonium-238 and cadmium to the police, RIA-Novosti reported, citing the Altai branch of the Emergency Situations Ministry.

Plutonium-238 cannot be used for nuclear weapons because it generates so much heat that the weapon would not be stable, according to the U.S. Department of Energy. However, it can be used to build a so-called dirty bomb, which combines radioactive material with conventional explosives and contaminates an area with the radioactive material upon detonation.

Grigorov, who worked as a nuclear physicist for the Zmeinogorsk mining company until it shut down in 1992, said he found the containers in 1997 in a garbage dump where some mine equipment had been sent instead of being shipped to Radon, the federal radioactive waste enterprise, Strana.ru reported. Plutonium is used to test mined ore. Grigorov said he took the containers to his garage for safekeeping and wrote several letters to the authorities alerting them of his find, but no one replied.

He decided to hand over the containers after reading in a newspaper that the police were buying weapons from civilians and offering them amnesty.

Police, however, are considering pressing charges, Strana.ru said.

There were conflicting reports on how much plutonium was in the containers and how many containers Grigorov had. The local branch of the Emergency Situations Ministry said there were 10 containers and four contained a mixture of plutonium and cadmium, RIA-Novosti said. The others had cadmium only. Strana.ru, citing local police, said Grigorov surrendered eight containers and each contained 50 grams of plutonium-238. The report, however, erroneously referred to the substance as weapons-grade plutonium.

One milligram of plutonium-238 sells for \$8.25 on the legal market, putting the value of Grigorov's find at about \$3.3 million, Strana.ru said.

Federal Nuclear Power Service spokesman Nikolai Shingarev declined to comment on the price, noting only that 1 kilogram of the material costs millions of dollars on the international market. He said the containers were probably devices used to test ore. He said such devices usually use plutonium-238 as a source of energy but only "a gram or so is needed for that purpose."

He and Igor Putilov, spokesman for the Altai branch of the Emergency Situations Ministry, stressed that the plutonium-238 could not be used in a nuclear bomb and that it is widely used in mining and other industries. Authorities regularly detain people on charges of possessing or trying to sell radioactive materials and have taken steps to boost security at nuclear arsenals and civil nuclear facilities.

Some facilities remain poorly guarded, and authorities have abandoned their initial skepticism about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. President Vladimir Putin is now pushing for a United Nations convention on combating nuclear terrorism.

The turmoil after the Soviet collapse offered opportunities for insiders at nuclear facilities to steal nuclear materials, and a few may have some stashed away, said Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. But few would be able to sell the materials, he said.

"People who have access are middle-aged, have a very tight and stable circle of acquaintances, and have no knowledge of a foreign language. Any attempt to sell would draw attention," he said.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/11/03/011.html>

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Los Angeles Times

November 4, 2004

Pg. 1

## **Soldiers Describe Looting Of Explosives**

*Iraqis piled high-grade material from a key site into trucks in the weeks after Baghdad fell, four U.S. reservists and guardsmen say.*

By Mark Mazzetti, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In the weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Iraqi looters loaded powerful explosives into pickup trucks and drove the material away from the Al Qaqaa ammunition site, according to a group of U.S. Army reservists and National Guardsmen who said they witnessed the looting.

The soldiers said about a dozen U.S. troops guarding the sprawling facility could not prevent the theft because they were outnumbered by looters. Soldiers with one unit — the 317th Support Center based in Wiesbaden, Germany — said they sent a message to commanders in Baghdad requesting help to secure the site but received no reply.

The witnesses' accounts of the looting, the first provided by U.S. soldiers, support claims that the American military failed to safeguard the munitions. Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency — the U.N. nuclear watchdog — and the interim Iraqi government reported that about 380 tons of high-grade explosives had been taken from the Al Qaqaa facility after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. The explosives are powerful enough to detonate a nuclear weapon.

During the last week, when revelations of the missing explosives became an issue in the presidential campaign, the Bush administration suggested that the munitions could have been carted off by Saddam Hussein's forces before the war began. Pentagon officials later said that U.S. troops systematically destroyed hundreds of tons of explosives at Al Qaqaa after Baghdad fell.

Asked about the soldiers' accounts, Pentagon spokeswoman Rose-Ann Lynch said Wednesday, "We take the report of missing munitions very seriously. And we are looking into the facts and circumstances of this incident."

The soldiers, who belong to two different units, described how Iraqis plundered explosives from unsecured bunkers before driving off in Toyota trucks.

The U.S. troops said there was little they could do to prevent looting of the ammunition site, 30 miles south of Baghdad.

"We were running from one side of the compound to the other side, trying to kick people out," said one senior noncommissioned officer who was at the site in late April 2003.



"On our last day there, there were at least 100 vehicles waiting at the site for us to leave" so looters could come in and take munitions.

"It was complete chaos. It was looting like L.A. during the Rodney King riots," another officer said.

He and other soldiers who spoke to The Times asked not to be named, saying they feared retaliation from the Pentagon.

A Minnesota television station last week broadcast a video of U.S. troops with the 101st Airborne Division using tools to cut through wire seals left by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, at Al Qaqaa, evidence that the high-grade explosives remained inside at least one bunker weeks after the war began.

The video was taped April 18, 2003, while soldiers from the 101st Airborne searched Al Qaqaa for chemical and biological weapons. The IAEA had placed seals on nine of the bunkers at the complex, where inspectors had found high-grade explosives. Other bunkers contained more conventional munitions.

After opening bunkers, including one containing the high-grade explosives, U.S. troops left the bunkers unsecured, the Minnesota station reported.

According to the four soldiers — members of the 317th Support Center and the 258th Rear Area Operations Center, an Arizona-based Army National Guard unit — the looting of Al Qaqaa occurred over several weeks in late April and early May.

The two units were stationed near Al Qaqaa at a base known as Logistics Support Area (LSA) Dogwood. Soldiers with the units said they went to the ammunition facility soon after the departure of combat troops from the 101st Airborne Division.

The soldiers interviewed by The Times could not confirm that powerful explosives known as HMX and RDX were among the munitions looted.

One soldier said U.S. forces watched the looters' trucks loaded with bags marked "hexamine" — a key ingredient for HMX — being driven away from the facility. Unsure what hexamine was, the troops later did an Internet search and learned of its explosive power.

"We found out this was stuff you don't smoke around," the soldier said.

According to a list of "talking points" circulated by the Pentagon last week, when U.S. military weapons hunters visited Al Qaqaa on May 8, 2003, they found that the facility "had been looted and stripped and vandalized." No IAEA-monitored material was found, the "talking points" stated.

A senior U.S. military intelligence official corroborated some aspects of the four soldiers' accounts. The official who tracked facilities believed to store chemical and biological weapons — none was ever found in Iraq — said that Al Qaqaa was "one of the top 200" suspect sites at the outset of the war.

Despite the stockpiles at the site, no U.S. forces were specifically assigned to guard Al Qaqaa — known to U.S. forces in Iraq as Objective Elm — after the 101st Airborne left the facility.

Members of the 258th Rear Area Operations Center, responsible for base security at nearby LSA Dogwood, came across the looting at Al Qaqaa during patrols through the area. The unit, which comprised 27 soldiers, enlisted the help of troops of the 317th Support in securing the site, the soldiers said.

The senior intelligence official said there was no order for any unit to secure Al Qaqaa. "No way," the officer said, adding that doing so would have diverted combat resources from the push toward Baghdad.

"It's all about combat power," the officer said, "and we were short combat power.

"If we had 150,000 soldiers, I'm not sure we could have secured" such sites, the officer said. "Securing connotes 24-hour presence," and only a few sites in Baghdad were thought to warrant such security.

Troops of the two units went to Al Qaqaa over a week in late April but received no orders to maintain a presence at the facility, the soldiers said. They also said they received no response to a request for help in guarding the facility.

"We couldn't have been given the assignment to defend a facility unless we were given the troops to do it, and we weren't," said one National Guard officer. "[Objective] Elm being protected or not protected was not really part of the equation. It wasn't an area of immediate concern."

Some confusion came in late April 2003 when U.S. commanders in Baghdad reassigned military responsibility for the area surrounding Al Qaqaa from Army units to the 1st Marine Division, which had participated in the assault on Baghdad and eventually took control over much of southern Iraq.

According to Marine sources, when the 1st Marine Division took over, the combat unit didn't have enough troops to secure ammunition depots scattered across central and southern Iraq. The Al Qaqaa facility, they said, was of particular concern.

"That site was just abandoned by the 101st Airborne, and there was never a physical handoff by the 101st to the Marines. They just left," said a senior officer who worked in the top Marine command post in Iraq at the time. "We knew these sites were being looted, but there was nothing we could do about it."

During the same period, Marines came across another massive ammunition depot near the southern Iraqi town of Diwaniya, the senior officer said. They sent a message to the U.S. headquarters in Baghdad seeking guidance on how to keep the site from being plundered.

Commanders in Baghdad responded that the Marines should attempt to blow up the depot. The Marine officers responded that the site was too large to demolish.

Commanders in Baghdad "didn't have a good response to that," the officer said. "There was no plan to prevent these weapons from being used against us a year later."

*Times staff writer Greg Miller in Washington contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-explosives4nov04,1,5429574.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

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Washington Times

November 5, 2004

Pg. 5

## Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

### Weapons buy

The Pentagon is expected to announce several key arms-budget decisions on major programs, perhaps as early as today, we are told.

Key spending decisions on the arms were put off until after the presidential election and now a series of program budget decisions, or PBDs as the Pentagon calls them, will be announced. Most involve billions of dollars in weapons to be produced or developed.

One new item, defense officials said, is a decision to spend over \$1 billion on equipment and technology for defenses against weapons of mass destruction.

The program will be one of the first efforts to buy goods that will be needed in response to an attack from what the Pentagon calls "CBRNE," or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive strikes.

The defenses include everything from new protective suits to capabilities to quickly mass-produce vaccines for use against biological weapons.

It will examine whether buildings need special air controls to block the introduction of deadly chemicals or germ weapons.

Sensors to detect chemical and biological arms also will be included. The WMD program is being compared to the big push by the Pentagon in the 1990s to bolster military "force protection" following terrorist attacks on troops overseas.

Another big-ticket item to be announced is a plan to direct the Air Force and Navy on purchases of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the newest generation warplane. The jet comes in conventional and short-takeoff configurations. The aircraft will be adapted for use by the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

The PBD is expected to direct the Navy and Air Force to adopt two different jet engines, in case one engine is found later to have flaws. Using different engines — one from General Electric and one from Pratt & Whitney — is a hedge to prevent an entire fleet of more than 1,000 aircraft from potentially being grounded at the same time.

A third decision will be to direct the Navy to continue development of the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, or JASSM, instead of relying solely on the Tomahawk cruise missile.

Also, the Air Force will be required to buy the Joint Standoff Weapon, or JSOW, a precision-guided bomb, instead of its precision-guided cluster bomb kits for "dumb" bombs called the Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser-Extended Range, known as "WICMID-ER."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/inring.htm>

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Washington Post

November 5, 2004

Pg. 4

## U.S. Awards Anthrax Vaccine Deal

*Under Project Bioshield, Firm Will Make Doses for Stockpile*

By Marc Kaufman, Washington Post Staff Writer

The government awarded its first contract under the Project Bioshield program yesterday -- an \$877 million deal with a small California company to make 75 million doses of a newly developed anthrax vaccine. Under the contract, VaxGen Inc. will begin delivering the vaccine to the strategic national stockpile within two years at a fixed price negotiated with the Department of Health and Human Services.

The Food and Drug Administration has not reviewed the vaccine for safety or effectiveness, and yesterday officials said that will not happen until 2007. But under the Bioshield legislation, the vaccine can be distributed and used before official approval if the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention declares a health emergency.

The new vaccine will be made using purified proteins created by cloning. The proteins stimulate the immune system to produce antibodies that can neutralize anthrax toxins.

HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson said no company would produce the anthrax vaccine if the government did not agree to buy a specified amount in advance. "Acquiring a stockpile of this new anthrax vaccine is a key step toward protecting the American public against another anthrax attack," he said. In October 2001, five people died and six were hospitalized after inhaling anthrax spores released from mailed envelopes; no one has been charged. The first 75 million doses will be stored in the national stockpile for use in an emergency, but the vaccine could be available to the general public and the military after FDA review and approval. As currently formulated, the anthrax immunization requires three separate injections and, according to VaxGen officials, is effective both before and after exposure to the deadly bacteria.

Initial work on the vaccine was done by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md. In 2002, VaxGen licensed the product and, working largely with public money from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, developed a manufacturing process.

VaxGen, founded in 1995 as a spinoff from biotech giant Genentech Inc., was involved in the development of a much-anticipated, but ultimately unsuccessful, AIDS vaccine in the late 1990s. In August, the company stumbled again, announcing that the Nasdaq exchange was delisting its stock because the company had not filed two quarterly reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. VaxGen said the reports were delayed because it was implementing new accounting policies and would need to restate earnings reports dating to 2002.

Nasdaq informed VaxGen that the issues did not appear to result from impropriety, the company said. VaxGen said it would file the reports in October, but they have yet to be filed.

The company has also faced several class-action lawsuits by shareholders who allege the company "misled investors about the progress of certain clinical trials and our future manufacturing and marketing plans," according to VaxGen filings with the SEC.

The \$5.6 billion Bioshield program was signed into law by President Bush on July 21 in an effort to develop defenses against possible biological weapons.

The new anthrax vaccine is a centerpiece of Bioshield, but many questions remain about its effectiveness and how long it can be stored. In a conference call, VaxGen CEO and President Lance K. Gordon said its shelf life is expected to be two or three years.

Another anthrax vaccine that is already available was, until last week, a required immunization for many active-duty military personnel. That vaccine, an older type that is cultured in a growth medium, was approved by the FDA in late 2003, but a federal judge ruled last week that the agency did not follow proper procedures and the Defense Department has stopped its inoculations. The vaccine is manufactured by BioPort Corp. of Lansing, Mich., under a \$245 million Pentagon contract.

BioPort spokeswoman Kim Brennen Root said HHS also announced yesterday its intention to purchase at least 5 million doses of its product, BioThrax, for the strategic stockpile. "This is an important first step in the overall preparedness of the nation, and especially for potential first responders," she said.

*Staff writer Michael Rosenwald contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26564-2004Nov4.html>

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Boston Globe  
November 4, 2004

## **Brazil Near Deal On Nuclear Inspection**

*Would let agency have partial view*

By George Jahn, Associated Press

VIENNA -- The UN atomic watchdog agency has tentatively agreed to a deal with Brazil that allows inspectors only a partial view of sensitive fuel enrichment technology but satisfies concerns that the country's nuclear programs are peaceful, diplomats said yesterday.

Brazil has refused for months to allow UN inspectors to see the enriching centrifuges at its plant in Resende, 60 miles northwest of Rio de Janeiro, saying the plant's advanced technology could be stolen by other countries if outsiders were allowed to view it.

The International Atomic Energy Agency wants to make sure that uranium being processed through centrifuges at Resende is neither enriched to weapons-grade levels nor diverted to other sites.

Diplomats, familiar with the dispute between Brazil and the IAEA, told The Associated Press the compromise appeared to satisfy concerns on both sides. Brazil's Science and Technology Ministry said yesterday it won't have any official comment until it hears directly from the agency.

Diplomats told the AP last month that agreement was near, but the agency had been waiting to speak with experts who recently returned from a tour of the plant. A Western diplomat said yesterday that a deal was likely now that those specialists had found that the plant was viable.

"The squabble was that the Brazilians didn't want the agency to have any visual access," said the diplomat, who demanded anonymity. "But the agency needed to have as much visual access as it deemed necessary to do the job" of verifying that uranium is neither enriched to weapons-grade levels nor diverted to other sites.

Uranium enriched to low levels is used for fuel to generate electricity.

More highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium can be used in nuclear warheads. Brazil denies it is building such arms.

IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said the Brazilian government was "being constructive" and the inspectors' report will be analyzed before a final decision.

The tentative compromise would allow inspectors to see some parts of the centrifuges while other parts are hidden from view, another diplomat said. Computer-generated diagrams would be provided to the agency specialists to flesh out what they are not allowed to see, he said.

Diplomats say the IAEA does not believe Brazil is trying to make nuclear weapons.

Still, any deal with the IAEA short of full visual inspection would do little to settle questions about whether Brazil's enrichment program is based on illicitly acquired technology.

Brazil's reluctance to let the inspectors see all of its nuclear program also has heightened concerns that it could serve as a precedent for other nations being asked to provide full access to their nuclear programs, such as Iran and possibly North Korea if it again accepted international inspections.

One of the diplomats familiar with Brazil's nuclear dossier said the nation's reluctance to fully open its centrifuge program to outside scrutiny could partially be due to fears that it would expose past illicit purchases.

Brazil ran a secret nuclear military program before giving it up in the 1980s, much of it based on secret procurement.

[http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/11/04/brazil\\_near\\_deal\\_on\\_nuclear\\_inspection/](http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/11/04/brazil_near_deal_on_nuclear_inspection/)

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Associated Press  
November 5, 2004  
**Middle East - AP**

## **U.N.: Traces of Plutonium Found in Egypt**

*By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer*

VIENNA, Austria - The U.N atomic watchdog has discovered plutonium particles near an Egyptian nuclear facility and is trying to determine if they are evidence of a secret weapons program or simply the byproduct of peaceful research, diplomats said Friday.

In comments to The Associated Press, the diplomats warned against assuming Egypt might have violated the Nonproliferation Treaty by trying to separate plutonium, a substance used to make nuclear weapons. The traces could be from a cracked research reactor fuel element or have other, nonmilitary origins, the diplomats said on condition of anonymity.

"From time to time these things pop up in places they should not be at," said a diplomat familiar with the investigations of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency. "Most of the time, there is a reasonable answer."

Still, he said agency experts trying to determine the origin of the particles were not ruling out any possibilities until seeing the test results from several European laboratories analyzing the Egyptian samples.

The discovery of the particles was a reflection of more efficient controls by the IAEA of member nations' nuclear activities over the past decade as it attempts to prevent proliferation either by rogue nations or black-market profiteers.

The controls include more pervasive environmental sampling, which is meant to trace particles of plutonium and enriched uranium — two alternate components of nuclear weapons.

Such tests have revealed traces of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium in Iran — evidence, says the United States, of a secret weapons program. Iran insists it is working only to generate nuclear power.

A Vienna-based diplomat said Friday that the agency's information was still too sketchy to firmly establish how old the Egyptian plutonium traces were. But he suggested they appeared to have been released into the environment no later than the 1980s.

Egypt appeared to turn away from the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program decades ago. The Soviet Union and China reportedly rebuffed its requests for nuclear arms in the 1960s, and by the 1970s, Egypt gave up the idea of building a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant.

Egypt runs small-scale nuclear programs for medical and research purposes. Plans were floated as recently as 2002 to build the country's first nuclear power reactor. But no construction date has been announced, and the pro-government Al-Ahram Weekly recently reported that the plant site near the coastal town of Al-Dabaa might be sold to make way for tourism development.

Although it signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, Egypt in recent years has become one of its vocal critics, mainly because of concerns over Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal and more recent fears about Iran's nuclear agenda. Attempts to reach diplomats for comment at Egyptian Embassy in Vienna after office hours Friday were unsuccessful.

Cairo earlier this week denounced a French newspaper report linking Egypt to Libya's now-dismantled nuclear weapons program and suggesting the IAEA's Egyptian head, Mohamed ElBaradei, was protecting his country from scrutiny.

But one of the diplomats suggested the IAEA's search and testing in Egypt reflected the impartiality of ElBaradei, and said that — if there are any suspicions about the origins of the plutonium — the agency head would be sure to report it to the IAEA's board of governors.

[http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=540&ncid=716&e=4&u=/ap/20041105/ap\\_on\\_re\\_mi\\_ea/nuclear\\_agency\\_egypt](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=540&ncid=716&e=4&u=/ap/20041105/ap_on_re_mi_ea/nuclear_agency_egypt)

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